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Abstract
Digital contact tracing approaches
based on Bluetooth low energy (BLE)
have the potential to efficiently contain
and delay outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases such as the ongoing SARS-CoV-
2 pandemic. In this work we propose a
novel machine learning based approach
to reliably detect subjects that have
spent enough time in close proximity to
be at risk of being infected. Our study
is an important proof of concept that
will aid the battery of epidemiological
policies aiming to slow down the rapid
spread of COVID-19.
Contact tracing is an effective instrument to
contain and delay outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases such as the ongoing SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic. Individuals that have been in con-
tact with an infected person are identified,
asked to remain in quarantine and are being
tested. However, manually following contact
histories is labor-intensive, slow and incom-
plete, as chance encounters, e.g. in the public
transport, can not be fully reconstructed. The
emergence of digital solutions, which automat-
ically reconstruct the duration and proximity
of encounters, is highly promising to enhance
established manual procedures with speed, ef-
ficiency, precision and full coverage of relevant
contact history. Ultimately, such proximity
tracing technologies have the potential to “re-
duce transmission enough to achieve R0 < 1
and sustained epidemic suppression, stopping
the virus from spreading further” [Ferretti
et al., 2020].
Various concepts for proximity tracing have
been proposed in the past [e.g. Salathe´
et al., 2010, Yoneki, 2011, Freunde Liberias,
e. V., 2018, Singapore Government Technol-
ogy Agency and Ministry of Health, 2020,
Chen et al., 2018]. Recently, the Pan-
European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Trac-
ing (see [PEPP-PT]) and Decentralized Pri-
vacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (see [DP-
3T]) initiatives were launched, both promis-
ing to enable proximity tracing in compli-
ance with the European general data protec-
tion regulation (GDPR) [Voigt and Von dem
Bussche, 2017]. Since a large percentage of
the world’s population carries smartphones,
these approaches make use of the BLE technol-
ogy. Contact advertisements regularly emitted
from these devices are used to assess the prox-
imity of encounters. For effectively contain-
ing the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, it is
necessary to reliably translate the BLE signal
strength measurements into risk estimates of
infection transmission. In this letter, we pro-
pose a novel approach for this conversion task.
Figure 1A illustrates a typical infection sce-
nario, which is difficult to manage with manual
contact tracing procedures. Here, an infected
person enters a public place (e.g. a supermar-
ket) and spends an extended amount of time in
close proximity (< 2m) to the contact person.
Both factors, namely the contact distance and
the contact duration, influence the risk for the
contact person of being infected.
Proximity tracing technologies allow to re-
construct such high risk encounters between
the infected and contact person, once the for-
mer has been tested positive. The infected
person is recording anonymous IDs of con-
tact persons within certain critical distance
range. These anonymous proximity histories
are encrypted and remain on the phone of the
infected person at all times. Only if tested
positive and upon agreement, the proximity
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history is analyzed and contact persons with
a high risk of being infected can be alerted
anonymously. In addition, health authorities
can be involved to handle these high risk cases
by standard procedures (e.g., test and quaran-
tine the contact persons).
Methods:
To make this approach practically applica-
ble, i.e., to avoid that every short time or dis-
tant encounter raises an alarm, it is crucial to
reliably estimate the risk of infection transmis-
sion from the BLE signal strength measure-
ments. In this letter we propose to perform
this conversion in the following manner:
1. Define an epidemiological model to
convert proximity time series to in-
fection risk scores. The models E dis-
played in Figure 1B implement different
non-linear functions to translate time se-
ries of proximity values into infection risk
scores. For infections transmitted via the
droplet route, one usually assumes that
the infection risk decreases as the distance
dt between people increases; with some
critical distance from which on the risk
of being infected becomes vanishingly low
[Xie et al., 2007].
2. Use the epidemiological model for
data labeling. The chosen epidemiolog-
ical model is then used to label the data
needed to train the ML-based infection
risk predictor. For that, one integrates
the marginal infection risk within the crit-
ical distance over the contact duration T
to obtain an infection risk score
I =
T∑
t=1
E(dt).
An encounter between two individuals is
considered as “high risk” if the value of I
exceeds a predefined critical risk thresh-
old η. This threshold can either be set
locally, i.e., for each encounter1, or glob-
1For COVID-19 it is assumed that a physical prox-
imity between two people of less than 2 meters over a
time period of 900 seconds (15 minutes) results in a
high risk of being infected [European Centre for Dis-
ease Prevention and Control, 2020]. When setting η
locally, one would use these parameters to determine if
an encounter is labelled as “high risk” or not.
ally based on the basic reproduction rate2
R0.
3. Train a machine learning (ML)
model to estimate the infection risk.
We train a linear regression model to pre-
dict the infection risk score from the mea-
sured received signal strength (RSS) time
series of the BLE signal. For simplicity,
we do not provide the raw RSS time series
to the ML model, but compute features
(sum, mean, max etc.) on it and provide
this aggregated information to the model.
By thresholding γ, the output of the clas-
sifier, we can trade-off the obtained true
and false positive rates. Figure 1D illus-
trates the entire training and evaluation
pipeline, including ground truth risk esti-
mation, feature extraction and training of
the linear regression model.
Figure 1C displays the time series of raw
RSS values from the BLE signal, which the
smartphone of the infected person receives
from the smartphone of the contact person.
Although the values are noisy, it is possible
to reliably decide whether or not the infection
risk I exceeds a certain threshold, as shown in
our real-world experiments performed with 48
participants (see supplementary materials for
the details on the experimental setup).
Figure 1E, compares the ground truth risk,
as computed from the time series of ground
truth distances, with the predicted risk, es-
timated from the Bluetooth signal strength
data, for 392 contact episodes from a hold-
out validation set. As we can see, our machine
learning based approach, is able to achieve cor-
relation numbers of up to 0.95 for the linear
infection risk model. We compute the criti-
cal risk threshold η by inserting the reference
sequence dref , with
dreft ≡ 200cm and T ref = 900s (1)
into the different risk models. By vary-
ing the classifier sensitivity γ, we can trade-
off the number of correct and false alarms.
2The R0 value tells us the expected number of cases
directly generated by one case. A globally set critical
risk η, would label the data such that the number of
“high risk” encounters would match the expected num-
ber of cases.
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Figure 1: Overview of the proximity tracing concept and results. A: Typical infection scenario
in a public space (e.g. a supermarket), where close contact (< 2m) between an infected and a
contact person is established over a long enough period of time. B: An epidemiological model
translates a time series of contact distances into infectiousness scores, which are then used to
label the encounters in the training dataset. C: Example of a raw RSS time series of the
BLE signal, as well a corresponding contact distances. D: We train a linear regression model
to predict the infectiousness scores obtained from a given risk model. The linear regression
receives as input a list of features, which were derived from the raw rss data. E: The predictions
of the linear regression model correlate strongly with the ground truth risk (up to 0.95 for the
linear risk model). For a fixed critical risk threshold η the approach achieves high true positive
rates with very few false classifications. F: To this day only little is known about spreading
behaviour of SARS-Cov-2. In this work, we calibrated our epidemiological models according
to the latest recommendations of epidemiologists [European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control, 2020]. After large-scale deployment of proximity tracing technologies, it will be possible
to compare the predicted infection events with the actually measured ones. This may help to
refine epidemiological models.
The resulting receiver operating characteris-
tic (ROC) curve of the real-world experiment
displayed in Figure 1E shows that high true
positive rates can be achieved with relatively
few false classifications. Note that these ROC
curves depend on the data labeling procedure,
i.e., the epidemiological model and the thresh-
old η. Here we used the assumed parameters
for COVID-19, namely distance < 2 m and
exposure time > 15 min [European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control, 2020]. We
provide mean and maximum RSS value as well
as the number of received Bluetooth beacons
as features to the linear regression model; re-
sults with other features derived from the RSS
time series can be found in the supplementary
materials. The AUC (area under the ROC
curve) value of the predictor is found to be
larger than 0.9 for all investigated epidemio-
logical models. For the linear model AUCs
of up to 0.96 were obtained. The prediction
task becomes slightly more difficult for the box
and sigmoid models, which assign only negli-
gible risk to encounters above a certain dis-
tance. The repetition of this analysis on data
recorded on another day led to very similar
performance results, demonstrating the relia-
bility of the proposed approach (see supple-
mentary materials).
Figure 1F displays RSS sequence data3
along with the classification decisions of lin-
ear classifiers, which were trained to match
the predictions of three different epidemio-
logical models. These classification decisions
also depend on the corresponding thresholds
η. Clearly, once proximity tracing technolo-
gies will be rolled out for the broad popula-
tion, the true infection events will be observed
(given data donations and consent of all users
involved). Comparing the observed infections
with the predicted ones4 will provide evidence
for the true (and currently unknown) epidemi-
ological modeling assumptions.
3Every RSS sequence is represented as a dot. Dis-
played are only two features of every RSS sequence,
the maximum and the sum of the negative inverse RSS
values.
4Of course one could directly compare the risk
scores derived from the epidemiological model with
the observed infection events. However, to obtain the
scores from the epidemiological model, one need prox-
imity data which are unavailable in practice. The pro-
posed approach is scalable, because it directly esti-
mates the risk from RSS values.
In this letter we have proposed a novel ap-
proach to reliably detect subjects that have
spent enough time in close proximity to be
at risk of being infected. Thus our study is
an important proof of concept that will aid
the battery of epidemiological policies aiming
to slow down the rapid spread of COVID-19.
Note that while we have assumed the stan-
dard modeling of viral spread with the cur-
rently agreed on parameters (distance < 2
m and exposure time > 15 min, see [Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Con-
trol, 2020]), it may in fact be conceivable that
these parameters are not chosen conservatively
enough in the light of recent results on conta-
gious droplet spreading across larger distances
rsp. in aerosols (see e.g. [Bourouiba, 2020])
and moreover the improved binding affinity of
SARS-CoV-2 [Wrapp et al., 2020]. Clearly,
once proximity tracing technologies will be
rolled out for the broad population, then data
transmission events will become available that
will provide evidence for the true epidemiologi-
cal modeling assumptions. With that we could
find out whether the current risk assessment is
conservative enough or whether indeed social
distancing would need to be increased further.
Data Availability: The data that support
the findings of this study are available from
the corresponding author upon request.
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A Supplementary Material
A.1 Epidemiological Models
In our experiments we use three different epidemiological models to convert the proximity values
into infectiousness scores
Elinear(d) =
{
1 if d[cm] < 100
100
d[cm] else
(2)
Ebox(d) =
{
1 if d[cm] ≤ 200
0 else
(3)
Esigmoid(d) =
(
1 + exp
(
d[cm]− 200
30
))−1
, (4)
where d is the contact distance measured in cm. All three models are monotonically decreasing
functions of the distance and the infectiousness score decreases with increasing distance.
The main use of epidemiological models in our experiments is to generate ground truth labels
for our data, which consists of a time series of RSS values and corresponding distances (the
latter is not available in real settings). To generate the labels, we integrate the infectiousness
scores over the contact time according to the equation
I(d1, .., dT ) =
T∑
t=1
E(dt). (5)
A.1.1 Local and Global Risk Thresholds
For every epidemiological model E there exists a reference, from which on no infection is ex-
pected. For instance, for COVID-19 it is assumed that a physical proximity between two people
of less than 2 meters over a time period of 900 seconds (15 minutes) results in a high risk of being
infected [European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020]. Inserting the reference
sequence dref , with
dreft ≡ 200cm and T ref = 900s (6)
into equation (5) results in a local threshold
η = I(dref ) =
T ref∑
t=1
E(dreft ) (7)
By selecting the epidemiological model and the infectiousness threshold we can determine,
which time series of distance measurements should be considered dangerous and which should
not:
HighRisk(d1, .., dT ) =
{
True if I(d1, .., dT ) > η
False if I(d1, .., dT ) ≤ η
(8)
An alternative approach is to label the data with a global threshold. For that we need to
have an estimate of the expected number of newly infected contact persons Nnew from Ninf
previously infected persons. This number can be computed with the basic reproduction number
R0 as
Nnew = R0Ninf (9)
One can then chose η in a way so that the number of high risk encounters matches the expected
number of new infections, i.e., ∑
d∈D
1HighRisk(d) = Nnew (10)
where D is the total number of recorded proximity histories.
A.2 Infection Risk Estimation as a Regression Problem
Given an epidemiological model and the true distances we can label encounters into “high risk”
and “low risk”. Since the true distances are not available in real settings, we aim to train a
machine learning model to predict these labels from the raw5 RSS measurements of the BLE
signal. To simplify the learning task, we extract features from the RSS data and provide them
as input to the ML algorithm. In particular, we tested the following three feature sets:
1. sum: total sum of received RSS values resulting in one-dimensional features
2. dur max mean: duration, maximum and mean of received RSS values resulting in three-
dimensional features.
3. freq: amplitudes of first 30 frequencies of received RSS values resulting in 30-dimensional
features.
We input these features into a linear regression model in order to obtain a predicted “risk”
score:
Ipredict(RSS1, .., RSST ) = 〈A, f(RSS1, .., RSST )〉+ b (11)
The input to the linear regression thus comprises a vector of parameters A, a bias term b and
a vector of extracted features f(RSS1, .., RSST ). The resulting predicted risk score is then
compared to a threshold, which can be set to η. If the predicted risk exceeds the threshold the
encounter which resulted in the sequence of RSS measurements is considered “high risk“.
A.3 Real-World Experiment
A.3.1 Experimental Setup
A measurement campaign was performed to test and validate the proposed infection risk esti-
mation model. This section describes the setup of the experiment.
The measurements on the 1st of April and the 7th of April were performed using 48 Samsung
A40 smartphones of the same type that were carried by 48 protected soldiers, respectively. Tests
were carried out at five different locations within the Julius Leber barracks in Berlin. There
were three rooms within a conference center and two outdoor locations, with ten subjects each.
All test subjects were equipped with face masks so that there was no risk of infection.
The floor of the test areas was marked (Fig. 2). These markings consisted of a 5 m x 5 m grid
with lines spaced 50 cm apart. From the starting point (box within a box) to the ending point
(multiplication sign), the test subjects had to walk through markings and stay on each marker
for a predetermined amount of time (2, 4, 6, or 10 min). The markings are numbered on the
green path from 1 to 9 and on the black path from 2 to 10 (Fig. 2, right). Two cameras were
installed at each location to video record the test so that the exact locations of the test subjects
could be checked after the test. The test was carried out in four runs. During the runs, the
test subjects were instructed not to move too much, to hold the positions of the mobile phones
relatively stable, and to stand within the square.
A.3.2 Data and Preprocessing
RSS data was collected via a prototype of the PEPP-PT App. The RSS data - recorded at a
random and potentially varying frequency between 0.1 Hz and 10 Hz - was re-sampled to 1Hz.
Ground truth distance data was derived from the predefined movement pattern on the grid. The
labeling was additionally verified with the help of video footage that was taken at the test area.
For every pair of soldiers we collected multiple data points, where one data point comprised of
two aligned sequences:
• A time series of distances dt, t = 1, .., T (from which the ground truth risk can be derived).
5For practical reasons we resampled the RSS values to 1Hz.
Figure 2: Test pattern on the floor of the five test areas (left with grid, right without grid).
• A time series of BLE RSS values RSSt, t = 1, .., T , recorded by mobile phones held by the
soldiers.
A.3.3 Training and Testing Data
For training and testing, the time series data was separated into two folds according to the
room in the test area in which the data was collected. Data collected in rooms 1 and 2 (indoor)
and room 4 (outdoor) was combined in the training set. Data collected in rooms 3 (indoor)
and 5 (outdoor) was combined in the validation set. In previous tests multiple combinations of
indoor and outdoor rooms were tested to investigate possible covariate shift between indoor and
outdoor scenarios. No significant effects could be detected, therefore the aforementioned mixed
split was used.
A.3.4 Results
We trained a machine learning model to predict the ground truth risk, by only using features
extracted from the RSS time series data RSS1, .., RSST . Since the labels are not balanced (i.e.
there are more negative than positive events), we use area under the ROC (receiver operating
characteristics) curve (AUC) metric to evaluate the performance of our model. The AUC metric
is a measure for how well the data can be separated using our classifier. An AUC value of 0.5
indicates no predictive power and 1.0 indicates perfect predictive power.
The obtained results are presented in Fig. 3. The columns correspond to different epidemiolog-
ical models, namely (linear, box, sigmoid), whereas the rows represent different combinations
of features which we feed into the linear regression. Given the critical risk threshold derived by
applying the respective risk model to the reference sequence (1), we display the achieved AUC
for every combination of risk model and feature combination.
An encounter between two individuals is labeled as “high risk” if the value of I exceeds
a predefined critical risk threshold η. This threshold can either be set locally, i.e., for each
encounter, or globally based on the basic reproduction rate R0.
A.3.5 Follow-up Study
In order to evaluate the reliability of our results, we tested the model on data recorded with
the same experimental setup, but on a different dates (7th April 2020 and 14th April 2020).
In the experiments conducted during the 14th of April, participants were using different smart
phone models and the phone holding positions were varied (”hand”, ”ear”, ”pocket”). Figure
4 compares the AUC values of the two measurement campaigns for the three epidemiological
models (linear, box, sigmoid) and three sets of features (sum, dur max mean, freq). As can
be seen, the performance of the proposed infection risk estimation method is comparable for the
experiments conducted on the 1st of April and the 7th of April. For the experiments conducted
on the 14th of April however the feature set dur max mean distinctively outperforms all other
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Figure 3: Ground truth risk vs predicted risk for different epidemiological risk models and
combinations of features supplied to our machine learning model.
tested feature combinations. Evidently this combination of features is able to approximate the
ground truth risk in a more robust way than the other investigated feature combinations.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the results on data recorded on three different days. Every marker
corresponds to a epidemiological model ((linear - green, box - orange, sigmoid - blue) and a
set of features (sum, dur max mean, freq). Only the feature set dur max mean is robust to the
changes in testing environment that occurred during the third measurement campaign on April
14th.
